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Notwithstanding the ambiguous research and productivity promoting effects of plant variety 
protections (PVPs), even in developed countries, many developing countries have adopted 
PVPs in the past few years, in part to comply with their Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) obligations. Seeking and maintaining PVPs reserves options to an 
expected revenue stream from the future sale of protected varieties, the value of which varies 
for a host of reasons. In this paper we empirically examine the pattern of plant variety 
protection applications in China since its PVP laws were first introduced in 1997. We place 
those PVP rights in the context of China’s present and likely future seed markets to identify 
the economic incentives and institutional influences on decisions to develop and apply for 
varietal rights.  
 
Keywords: intellectual property rights, crop improvement, option value, seed markets 
 
 
   1 
An Option Perspective on Generating and Maintaining 
Plant Variety Rights in China 
 
1.  Introduction 
The development and spread of new and improved seed varieties has been the basis for 
productivity improvement in agriculture since crops were first domesticated about 10 
millennia ago. For most of that time, new varieties were largely treated as common 
property, shared freely among farmers and countries and generating billions of dollars of 
benefits worldwide.
1 The era of free and unencumbered access to new crop varieties 
appears to be passing.  
In the United States and a few other jurisdictions, the intellectual property 
embodied in new plant varieties is subject to utility patent protection.
2 In a growing 
number of countries, plant breeders’ rights (PBRs), a sui generis form of intellectual 
property protection harmonized internationally through the UPOV (International Union 
for the Protection of New Plant Varieties) Convention, are on offer.
3 There were 20 
UPOV members at the end of 1992 and 53 members by July 2003, about half of whom 
                                                 
1 Nonetheless, a few countries sought to monopolize some genetic resources as described by Wright (1997). 
2 Henson-Apollonia (2002) estimated that by October 2002, there were 114 patents with claims to novel 
plants issued in the United States so far that year. 
3  Sui generis rights, like plant varietal or breeders’ rights, are rights designed for a specific field of 
technology. Part of the growth reflects countries coming into compliance with the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement that 
came into force on January 1, 1995. Article 27(3)(b) of the TRIPS Agreement requires that protection of 
plant varieties must be provided “either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any 
combination thereof.” Developed countries were required to implement most provisions of TRIPS within 
one year of the Agreement taking affect. Developing countries were given a five-year period to comply 
while the least developed countries had 10 years to put the provisions in place, subject to review. Even 
now, under national patent law, trading products with a country that is in violation of local forms of 
property protection makes the trade subject to sanctions and fines within that local jurisdiction 
(Binenbaum et al. 2003).   2 
are non-OECD countries. Since 1971, more than 136,000 PBRs have been lodged 
worldwide (Pardey, Koo and Nottenburg 2003). During the 1970s and 1980s, rich 
countries accounted for well over 90 percent of the total applications, but applications 
filed in lower income countries (including Argentina, Brazil, China, the Russian 
Republic, and South Africa) has been on the rise, and now account for nearly 30 percent 
of the world’s total.  
Like many other countries, China has, at least for now, taken the sui generis route 
to TRIPS compliance, passing a plant variety protection law in 1997. At this 
comparatively early stage of its implementation, a substantial number of questions arise. 
What is the specific nature of these intellectual property rights and the institutional 
arrangements in China to confer and protect them? To what extent are intellectual 
property rights on crop varieties being sought, and by whom? And what are the likely 
long-term effects of these rights on the amount, structure and conduct of agricultural 
R&D in China? Answers to these questions have potentially profound long-run 
consequences on the rate and direction of inventive activity in China’s agriculture. While 
all of these questions are amenable to empirical investigation, unfortunately data are 
sparse, not least because the history of implementing varietal rights in most developing 
countries, including China, is short.
4 
Our intent here is to document the emergence and current status of plant varietal 
rights in China and assess their likely longer-term effects. We include, but go beyond, a 
consideration of the legal aspects of varietal rights in China to provide an empirical 
                                                 
4 Prior efforts to analyze the economic effects of PVP legislation deal mainly with the United States and 
include Perrin et al. (1983), Butler and Marion (1985), Knudson and Pray (1991), and Alston and Venner 
(2002). Janis and Kesan (2002) examine some of the legal principles and practices concerning the U.S. 
Plant Variety Protection Act. Diez (2002) analyzes the situation in Spain.    3 
assessment of their extent and the institutional context that lay behind this form of 
property protection. An economic assessment of China’s seed markets is also provided as 
a basis for investigating the incentives to seek and maintain varietal protection for new 
crop varieties. 
2.  Economics of Varietal Protection 
Establishing, maintaining and exercising varietal rights is an economic decision made by 
breeders of new varieties subject to intellectual property protection. Plant breeders will 
seek or maintain intellectual property protection if the expected rent from a variety 
exceeds the cost of securing and exercising the rights to that variety. If information on the 
future stream of revenues from selling a variety were complete, plant breeders would 
simply calculate the present value of the future rents and the corresponding present value 
of the costs to make a one-time, up-front decision about securing and maintaining varietal 
rights.  
While the costs of gaining and securing plant variety protection are known with 
reasonable surety, the sequence of future returns from a varietal right is highly uncertain 
for many reasons. There are uncertainties about the size of the appropriable seed market 
for a given crop, the probability of commercial success of the protected variety, and the 
extent of enforcement of assigned property rights. Breeders often make annual or 
periodic renewal decisions, preserving the right to pay renewal fees and exercise their 
exclusionary rights in future periods.
5 Thus applying for (and subsequently renewing) 
                                                 
5 The U.S. situation is different; rights holders make one up-front payment with no further maintenance 
fees incurred for the life of the PVP right.   4 
PVP rights is a way of reserving the rights to potential future revenues, even if revenues 
in the short term are negligible. 
The expected value of holding plant variety rights consists of the current returns 
captured from the coming year and the option to renew the right in the subsequent year. If 
the right is not renewed, it lapses and the value of the variety to the breeder (but not 
necessarily others) is zero. Following Pakes (1986), the decision problem of a breeder to 
apply for or renew a varietal right at the beginning of the t
th period is expressed as 
  ( ) max{0, ( ) [ ( 1)| ( )] ( )} for 0 tr t E t I t c t t T Π= + β Π + − ≤ <  (1) 
where Π(t) is the expected discounted value of varietal protection at the beginning of the 
t
th period, r(t) is the return from the right during the coming t
th period, β is the discount 
factor,  I(t) is the information held at time t about the appropriable revenues from 
maintaining rights to the variety in the future, c(t) is the costs of reserving the 
exclusionary rights (i.e., the application fee or the subsequent costs of renewing and 
exercising ones exclusionary rights), and T is the statutory limit to PVP lives.
6 If the total 
benefit from holding the varietal right (the sum of current returns and the discounted 
value of the option) is greater than the cost c(t), breeders will opt to apply for or renew 
varietal rights.
7 Option values are zero at the end of year T when the right expires.  
Plant breeders often apply for or renew protection even if the current return r(t) is 
negligible because they expect the potential revenue from the varietal right to be higher in 
future years. A distinguishing aspect of most PVP laws is the “breeders’ exemption,” 
                                                 
6 For t = 0 the decision is whether or not to apply for PVP rights, while for 1 ≤ t < T the decision concerns 
the renewal or otherwise of the right. 
7 Generally, the option value from renewing varietal rights is non-negative and decreases over time as 
uncertainty regarding the appropriable stream of future revenues is reduced with better information. See 
Pakes (1986) for technical details.   5 
making it possible for others to use the protected variety in their own breeding programs 
and thus undermining the potential future revenue streams of the protected variety (as 
desired traits from the protected variety are incorporated into new and in other ways 
superior varieties). In contrast, it is an infringement subject to legally enforcable penalties 
to use varieties protected by patents to breed new varieties, absent assignment of use 
rights by the patentee. Thus holders of PVP rights have less control and surety over the 
revenue streams realized from their rights than patent holders  
The current return to a PVP right depends on the currently appropriable size of the 
seed market and the seed price premium of the protected variety over other varieties of 
the same crop. In this context, the option value placed on future revenue streams depends 
on the expected size of the appropriable seed market, the probability of successfully 
commercializing and appropriating rents from the protected variety, the rate of varietal 
obsolescence, and the discount rate. Varietal obsolescence has both biological and 
economic-cum-institutional dimensions. Biologically, varietal performance (in terms of 
pest or disease resistance as well as resilience to abiotic stresses) tends to deteriorate over 
time,
8 while the economic and institutional aspects of varietal obsolescence involve the 
extent of legal reuse of farmer-saved seed as well as the illegal spread or piracy of 
reproduced versions of the protected seed which vary among geopolitical and legal 
jurisdictions. Varietal obsolescence (or, conversely, the superiority of the protected 
variety over others) affects both the size and longevity of the price premium commanded 
                                                 
8 This diminution in yield (or, more generally, productivity) performance may not occur uniformly in all 
locations, so the relative superiority of a variety can, and usually does, have strong agro-ecological 
determinants.   6 
by the protected variety,
9 while effectively enforced PVP rights determine the overall 
magnitude of the rents that can be appropriated by those holding the varietal rights. 
3.  Generating, Regulating, and Marketing Improved Seed 
Changing R&D Markets
10 
Agricultural research in China has been and continues to be dominated by public 
agencies, staffed, operated, and largely financed by government.
11 Provincial institutes 
account for more than one-third of the government agencies and over half the public 
spending, with the remaining public expenditures are almost evenly divided between 
national and prefectural institutes. Some private research is conducted by local and 
multinational firms, but is still embryonic. 
As part of a broader effort to rein in government spending as well as encourage 
the development and commercialization of new technologies, the Chinese government 
launched a series of reforms concerning the funding and management of agricultural 
research in the mid-1980s. Public research institutes that hitherto relied solely on direct 
funding from government, almost entirely in the form of block grants, were now required 
to compete on a project-basis for some of their funding. They were also encouraged to 
raise some of their own revenues, giving rise to the establishment of “development firms” 
owned and operated by the respective research institutes. Initial efforts were fraught with 
                                                 
9 Varietal obsolescence also depends on the overall rate of technological change in an industry. For 
example, in the United States the effective commercial life of many hybrid corn varieties is now only 3-5 
years, with sustained higher rates of yield increases being associated with relatively rapid rates of 
commercial obsolescence for an individual variety. 
10 Fan and Pardey (1992, 1997) describe developments in Chinese agricultural R&D through to the early 
1990s. Fan et al. (2003) and Huang et al. (2002) provide some details of the more recent developments. 
11 The amount of public research spending in China is significant in global terms, accounting for about 10 
percent of public agricultural R&D spending worldwide in the mid-1990s (Pardey and Beintema 2001).    7 
management problems, exposed research institutes to potentially ruinous business risks, 
and often involved institute staff in undertakings only remotely related to research.
12 
Since the mid-1990s many public research agencies began more concerted efforts to 
exploit their research base to commercialize new technologies involving seeds, livestock 
vaccines, agricultural chemicals, machinery and so on. 
Some institutes have forsaken commercializing their own technologies via 
development firms, opting instead to focus on research and using others to bring their 
innovations to market, often on a contractual basis. Other institutes have evolved their 
commercial companies beyond in-house operations to limited liability shareholding 
companies, many times retaining controlling interests in these companies although some 
of the larger firms have recently been floated as public offerings to mobilize additional 
capital.
13 The companies spun-off from public research institutes now compete against 
other agribusiness firms, mainly state-owned seed, food, agricultural chemical and 
machinery enterprises facing similar, if not even more intense, pressures to wean 
themselves from government funding. Some of the state-owned agencies have also 
become shareholding companies in their own right, and a few have even begun 
developing their own research capacities—the beginnings of domestic private agricultural 
                                                 
12 For instance, the nationally recognized research institutes of Taihu and Lixiahe in Jiangsu province 
produced mineral water and set up a plant manufacturing auto spare parts, respectively. In 1988, the China 
National Rice Research Institute in Hangzhou launched a business to manufacture monosodium glutamate 
that lost more than 10 million yuan, saddling the institute with many legal battles as a result (Fan et al. 
2003).  
13 For example, the seed company of the Institute of Vegetable and Flower (IVF) of the Chinese Academy 
of Agricultural Science established in 1990 takes promising hybrid vegetables lines developed by IVF and 
conducts varietal demonstrations targeted to various markets, then produces and markets the seed 
commercially.  Since 1990 the seed company has earned more than 10 million yuan annually, returning 90 
percent of its earnings to IVF, which in turn allocates 10 percent of this income to commercially 
successful breeders with the rest used to cover general research or operational costs (Fan et al. 2003).   8 
R&D in China.
14 The amount of R&D collectively conducted by these firms is not known 
with any precision but is thought to be comparatively small, perhaps less than 5 percent 
of total agricultural R&D. 
Although it appears technologies developed by foreign firms played a key role in 
promoting agricultural productivity in some sectors such as chemicals and machinery 
(Rozelle et al., 1999), their investment in locally conducted, seed-related research has 
been small, mainly because of constrained commercial seed markets, ineffectual 
intellectual property rights, and various government regulations. Monsanto and Delta and 
Pine Land established joint ventures with local operations but are only authorized to sell 
genetically modified (GM) cotton varieties in Hebei and Anhui provinces.
15 Pioneer Hi-
Bred International (now part of Dupont) began operations in China about a decade ago, 
opening a breeding station and then setting up a seed company in Northeastern China 
about five years ago to screen, adapt, and demonstrate maize and soybean varieties 
(although apparently with no commercial releases to date), while the Cha Thai Group 
from Thailand set up a joint venture in Hubei province to develop and market improved 
hybrid maize and rice varieties. However, these operations are hampered by government 
refusal to allow foreign firms and their local affiliates to directly compete with domestic 
seed companies in certain provinces. Foreign firms are also presently prohibited from 
importing and directly selling hybrid rice and maize seeds produced outside of China.
16 
However, indications are the government will continue liberalizing these markets, 
                                                 
14 Government has selectively encouraged moves toward shareholding companies by way of exempting 
some firms from some taxes and providing low-interest loans. 
15 Notably, cotton is not included in the list of crops subject to PVP protection in China. 
16 Vegetable seeds can be imported and sold directly, as can hybrid maize and rice varieties developed 
outside China but bulked up within China. Presently, foreign firms can only operate as a minority partner 
with a Chinese controlled joint-venture firm.   9 
perhaps becoming fully WTO compliant in four to five years, after which local seed 
suppliers will be exposed to significant competitive pressure from foreign firms. The 
little local agricultural R&D done to date by multinational firms is limited to hybrid 
vegetable and sunflower seeds and genetically modified cotton. 
Changing Seed Regulations and Markets 
Developments in China’s commercial seed market are inextricably intertwined with 
changes in the supporting R&D markets and regulations. Prior to the 1989 Seed 
Administration Regulation, agricultural seed markets were almost the sole purview of 
state-owned seed agencies. These seed agencies monopolized all seed-related operations, 
including seed testing, production, quality control, and the distribution of new seeds 
typically obtained free of charge from public research institutes. They were also 
responsible for administering seed regulations in their respective local jurisdictions, 
meaning that the structure of the Chinese seed market up to the 1980s can be 
characterized as a series of regional monopolies under state government control.  
Although the market is still dominated by state-owned seed companies, the 
general agricultural market reforms introduced during the 1980s along with the 1989 
Seed Administration Regulations significantly changed the market opportunities for input 
suppliers, including those producing and distributing seed, and begun to erode the local 
monopoly positions held by the state agencies (Pray et al. 1998). First, the regulatory 
roles of the former seed agencies were separated from their seed business operations, 
which are now handled by state-owned seed companies or various other types of   10 
agribusiness firms. In addition, a plethora of private seed companies (usually small-scale 
family operations) restricted to selling vegetable seeds also emerged during the 1990s.
17 
The 1989 Seed Administration Regulations also gave legal status to the seed 
development firms emerging from the provincial, prefectural and some national research 
institutes. Initially, the seed development firms simply retailed the hybrid varieties of rice 
and maize developed by their respective research institutes. Many of these firms lacked 
sufficient land, expertise and operating capital to economically produce and distribute 
their own seeds and thus relied on state-owned seed companies or large farms for these 
operations. This is still so, although the relationship between the research institutes and 
the state-owned seed companies is changing considerably. Notably, the state-owned seed 
companies no longer have generally free access to the new varieties emanating from the 
public institutes. As a result, some of the state-owned seed companies (and especially 
those operating at the county and township levels) have opted simply to produce 
commercial quantities of seed on a contract basis, leaving the sale of that seed to others. 
Others, mainly but not exclusively operating at the provincial level, are specializing in 
seed marketing and distribution, and a few of the seed companies have also begun their 
own breeding programs. 
Market barriers were lowered even further with the implementation of the 2000 
Seed Law that supercedes the 1989 Seed Administration Regulation. The 2000 Seed Law 
involves no restrictions on the production of seeds other than a requirement for a license 
                                                 
17 We estimate there were around 2,700 state-owned seed companies in 2000, and about twice as many 
private seed companies.   11 
to produce hybrid maize and rice seed issued by a provincial or national agency.
18 Seed 
development firms or private seed companies can now compete with state-owned seed 
companies in many types of crops, and several firms have grown rapidly and command 
sizable market shares. This growth, including the merger or consolidation of various 
operations, leads to specialization among some firms (in terms of functions like seed 
production, marketing or distribution) and restructuring and integration on the part of 
other firms seeking scale and scope economies.
19 Some of the bigger firms have become 
shareholding companies hoping to become more competitive with or engage in joint 
ventures involving multinational companies, thereby providing access to more advanced 
management skills and research capacity.
20 
4.  Plant Variety Protection in China 
Institutional Aspects 
Spurred by preparations for entry to the WTO, China began significantly revising its laws 
regarding patents, copyrights, trademarks and other forms of intellectual property rights 
about a decade ago, including signing on to various international intellectual property 
conventions (Maskus and Dougherty 1998). Among the latest in a series of policy and 
                                                 
18 The intent of these licenses is to maintain seed quality, and so licenses are restricted to larger seed 
operations with in-house technical expertise. The provision of vegetable seed does not require a license. 
19 For instance, several years ago the Delong Group, with interests in machinery, financial services and 
telecommunications, began purchasing several state-owned seed companies in Anhui, Xinjiang, 
Shandong, and Inner Mongolia provinces, and in the process has become one of the country’s largest seed 
companies. 
20 For example, the Hunan Academy of Agricultural Sciences founded a seed company three years ago, 
Yuan Longping High-tech Agriculture Co. Ltd. (trading on the name of their renowned senior scientist, 
Yuan Longping, often called the “father of hybrid rice” in China), which purchased the seed distribution 
systems of several state-owned seed companies. This company has now evolved into a shareholding 
company, and moved well beyond its initial focus on hybrid rice to specialize on pepper seed which 
presently accounts for the preponderance of the firm’s income.   12 
legislative reforms affecting agriculture
21 and agricultural R&D in China over the past 
several decades is the extension of intellectual property rights to include agricultural 
innovations. China became a member state of the UPOV Convention on April 23, 1999 
after enacting its “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants” law (hereafter the PVP law) in March 1997. The law came into 
legal force on October 1, 1997 and PVP applications were accepted beginning April 
1999. 
  China’s PVP law conforms to the 1978 Act of the UPOV Convention. Like 
similar laws implemented elsewhere, the Chinese PVP law grants protection to varieties 
that are new, distinct, uniform and stable.
22 Holders of a PVP certificate have the legal 
right to exclude others from commercializing protected varieties for a prescribed length 
of time: 20 years since the date of grant for vines, forest trees, fruit trees, and ornamental 
plants, and 15 years for all other plants, including food, oil and fiber crops. Exceptions to 
the exclusionary rights are made, however, for both breeding and other scientific research 
(breeders’ exemption) and for the use of seeds saved by farmers for replanting (farmers’ 
exemption). 
Two separate administrative authorities implement China’s plant variety 
protection laws. The State Forestry Administration is responsible for forestry including 
forest trees, bamboo, woody plants and dry fruit trees, while the Ministry of Agriculture 
                                                 
21 Perkins (1988), Sicular (1988), Lin (1990), and Fan et al. (2003) provide perspectives on the considerable 
policy changes affecting Chinese agriculture, beginning with the moves to de-collectivize production 
initiated in late 1978. 
22 More specifically, to qualify for PVP protection in China a variety must be part of the botanical genera 
and species in the national list of protected varieties, not have been sold prior to the filing date of the 
application, be noticeably distinguishable from other known varieties, be uniform in relevant features or 
characteristics after propagation, breed true to type after repeated propagation, and have an adequate 
denomination (i.e., complies with compulsory seed certification and registration requirements).   13 
is responsible for all agricultural plants, including grains, vegetables, edible fungi, and 
grasses. On April 27, 2000, the State Forest Administration published its first and so far 
only “Gazette for Protection of New Varieties of Plants (Forestry),” which included 
information on 13 PVP applications for forest trees. Since then information on the 
applications for and granting of these PVP rights are scattered throughout various 
journals and newspapers.
23 In contrast, the Ministry of Agriculture has published a 
“Variety Protection Gazette for Agricultural Plants” on a bi-monthly basis since April 
1999.
24 This study deals with the protection of agricultural plant varieties, drawing on 
data compiled from various issues of the Ministry of Agriculture’s PVP Gazette. 
Upon receiving an application, the relevant authority is required to complete a 
preliminary examination within six months. If an application is then deemed acceptable, 
information such as the date of application, crop type, description of the variety for which 
protection is sought, and the names of the applicants are published in the PVP Gazette. 
For those applications passing preliminary examination, the authority conducts a 
substantive examination of the distinctness, uniformity, and stability of the variety in 
question. The granted rights prevail from the date of issuance of the PVP certificate, and, 
like PVP laws prevailing in many other countries, each new right pertains to a single new 
variety. 
Administrative procedures for protecting agricultural plants are handled by the 
Office of Variety Protection for Agricultural Plants within the Ministry of Agriculture. In 
                                                 
23 By early 2002, about 190 applications were filed for the varietal protection for forest trees, of which 48 
applications were granted (Faji Huang, Deputy Director of the PVP Office for Forest, personal 
communication). 
24 In July 2000, the gazette was renamed from “Plant Variety Protection Gazette” to “Variety Protection 
Gazette for Agricultural Plants,” hereafter called the PVP Gazette.   14 
early 2002, the office had a total of 12 full-time employees handling basic assessment 
and administrative tasks, with four staff involved in pre-examination activities and the 
rest engaged in testing and substantive examination.
25 The office devolves most of its 
biological evaluation to various testing centers, one main center located in Beijing plus 
14 other testing sites scattered throughout the main agricultural areas of China. Other 
procedures such as rejection of application, denomination of new varieties, and re-
examination of applications are handled by an ad-hoc committee, the Plant Variety Re-
examination Committee, which is convened when needed by senior administrators of the 
Ministry of Agriculture (Chen 2002). 
Once a PVP certificate is issued, the right holder is required to pay a series of 
annual fees over the period of protection to maintain the rights. The 1999 fee schedule 
administered by the Ministry of Agriculture (Table 1) is still the applicable fee schedule 
for agricultural plants. Establishing and maintaining protection for a full 15 years costs 
the right holder 47,089 yuan or US$5,687 for each plant variety right granted (excluding 
the administrative and other costs of submitting an application). More than 85 percent of 
the total fee is for maintaining the right. Establishing and maintaining PVP rights in 
China is costly, even by rich country standards. For example, as of February 2003 PVP 
fees in the United States are US$3,652 per variety (including a $432 application fee and a 
$3,220 examination fee).
26 
[Table 1: Costs of establishing and maintaining plant variety rights in China] 
                                                 
25 By way of comparison, in 2001, the PVP office of the United States employed 12 staff, including a 
commissioner, 9 examiners and 2 support staff. 
26 Part of the administrative cost differential may reflect who pays the cost of distinctness, uniformity, and 
stability tests. In the United States the applicant provides the required distinctness, uniformity, and 
stability information to the U.S. Plant Variety Protection Office. In China, often, but not always, the tests 
are conducted by the PVP office.    15 
Given the substantial differences in price levels between the United States and 
China, purchasing power parities (PPPs) instead of market exchange rates provide an 
alternative and somewhat more realistic basis for comparing PVP costs internationally. 
Using PPPs to denominate costs in terms of international dollars (rather than the U.S. 
dollars obtained when market exchange rates are used), the total administrative costs of 
establishing and maintaining PVP rights in China for a single variety for 15 years is 
$26,010 in 1999 prices (Table 1, right-hand column). This is almost five times more than 
the corresponding costs when using official market exchange rates to convert currencies, 
and more than ten times the corresponding costs in the United States. Although 
insufficient time has elapsed to meaningfully examine the renewal behavior of rights 
holders, the exceptionally high maintenance costs suggest that right holders in China will 
maintain their rights only if significant revenue is expected from the protection in the 
future. 
The Pattern of Varietal Protection 
A total of 923 PVP applications for agricultural plants were lodged and published in the 
PVP Gazette through September 2003. Figure 1 shows the number of PVP rights sought 
and granted on a quarterly basis beginning in April 1999 (when the first application was 
lodged) to July 2003 (the last published application for which we have data). An average 
of 18 applications were made monthly, but with substantial variation around the average 
and indications of an upward trend over time. The initial quarterly spike of 55 
applications (including 49 applications lodged in April 1999 alone) most likely reflects 
the latent demand for varietal rights for material developed prior to the implementation of 
the PVP law. The reported reduction in the number of applications in mid 2003 may be   16 
more apparent than real, reflecting lags between the date of application and its 
publication (which averaged about 3 months in our sample). A total of 412 PVP rights, 
about 45 percent of the total of 923 applications, were granted by September 2003. About 
a quarter of the applications lodged in 1999 are yet to be granted, although some may 
have been rejected or withdrawn in the interim.
27 The average grant lag for granted 
applications is about 20 months from the date of application.  
[Figure 1: Monthly applications and grants of plant variety rights] 
Based on an assessment of the early wave of PVP applications, Tong (2002) 
argued that the number of applications in China was limited because of a lack of 
appreciation of the role of property rights in a market economy, the high cost of gaining 
protection, the uncertain scope of protection, and complicated and costly enforcement 
processes. Some of these concerns are supported by our data, others are mute given the 
rapid changes afoot in the Chinese seed sector and some are questionable. In particular, 
the basic premise that the initial number of PVP applications was unduly constrained by 
Chinese-specific factors is debatable and the number is not out of line with the historical 
experience in the United States. Although there were an average of 345 PVP applications 
per year in the United States during the past ten years, there were only 121 applications 
per year for the decade following the passage of the U.S. Plant Variety Protection Act in 
1970 (compared with an average of 213 per year for China to date). 
                                                 
27 During the period from January 1971 to December 2002, a total of 7,386 PVP applications were made in 
the United States (and 7,199 through to December 2001 of which 4,960 certificates were granted for more 
than 190 crop species).   17 
Plant variety rights were sought for 23 different crops since 1999, and the number 
of crops for which varietal protection was sought has increased over time (Table 2).
28 
Applications were lodged for only 5 crops during the first 13 months of our sample, and 
for 19 crops during the last 13 months, reflecting in part the expanded number of crops 
eligible for protection. About 50 percent of the total number of applications was for 
maize, followed by rice (29 percent), wheat (5 percent), and soybean (3 percent). Most 
applications are made to protect food crops, with the share of applications for vegetable 
and fruit crops being less than 6 percent. Perhaps surprisingly, the preponderance of the 
protection sought is for hybrid, not open-pollinated, maize and rice varieties. The 
institutional arrangements for producing finished seed and the state of legal recourse for 
piracy may account for this apparent anomaly. The common practice in China is for 
research institutes or seed development firms to outsource the production of commercial 
quantities of seed, often to state-owned seed companies who in turn contract with 
individual growers to produce the seed. Under these circumstances, crop breeders (i.e., 
seed development firms or their respective research institutes) run the real risk of piracy 
or theft of their in-bred hybrid lines, and so plant variety protection certificates provide 
an additional legal avenue of recourse beyond that offered by contract law. 
[Table 2: PVP applications by crop] 
  By way of comparison, state trade secret laws in the United States effectively 
protect the theft of hybrid in-bred lines. For example, in 1994 Holden Foundation Seeds 
were judged liable for misappropriating Pioneer Hi-Bred’s in-bred hybrid corn lines 
                                                 
28 In September 1999 a total of 10 species were eligible for protection, increasing to 41 species by 
September 2003 (including 7 major cereals, 2 oil crops, 2 roots and tubers, 17 vegetables and fruits and 13 
flowers and grasses).   18 
under Iowa trade secret law. They were ordered to pay $46 million to Pioneer Hi-Bred 
International, an estimate of the profits forgone by illegal use of these in-bred lines.
29 
Utility patents provide an additional means of protecting in-bred lines in the United 
States. As a consequence, the share of hybrid varieties for which plant variety protection 
is sought is very small in the United States. Among the more than 190 crops for which 
PVP protection was sought during the past 30 years in the United States, open pollinated 
crops accounted for the lion’s share of applications. For example, soybeans accounted for 
1,362 applications (18 percent of the total) and wheat for 597 (8 percent) of the 
applications. Only 12 percent of the total applications were for corn varieties. 
The majority of Chinese PVP applications (69 percent of the total) were filed by 
national, provincial and prefectural public research institutes and universities (Table 3). 
Among these institutes, nearly half the applications were made by provincial institutes, 
more than one-third by prefectural institutes, 9 percent by universities, and only 2 percent 
by national research agencies such as the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences 
(CAAS). These institutional shares are roughly consistent with the corresponding shares 
of overall investments in agricultural research. Both publicly-held seed development 
firms and state-owned seed companies accounted for about 11 percent of the applications, 
with another 16 percent made by the shareholding companies spun off from these firms. 
The demarcation between the public and private sectors in China is sometimes difficult to 
discern, but we estimate that 80 percent of the PVP applications are lodged by public 
agencies (i.e., excluding shareholding companies). This contrasts markedly with the 
United States where the public-sector share of PVP applications is only 15 percent. 
                                                 
29 Pioneer Hi-Bred International. v. Holden Found. Seeds, 35 F.3d 1226, 1240 (8th Cir. 1994). See Goss 
(1996) for more details.   19 
Notably, multinational companies accounted for few filings in China (two for potatoes, 
two for ornamental crops, and one for pepper), a reflection of restrictive government 
regulations. 
[Table 3: Plant variety protection by type of applicant] 
Table 4 gives more detail regarding individual applications and the crops 
involved. More than 200 different applicants applied for protection during the sample 
period, but the distribution is skewed toward a few applicants. Just 10 institutions account 
for more than 30 percent of the total applications—7 percent were made by the Jilin 
Academy of Agricultural Science (AAS), 4 percent by Jiangsu AAS, and 3 percent by 
Heilongjiang AAS, Laizhou AAS, and Dandong AAS. A further 18 percent of the total 
applications were lodged by 130 applicants who each filed less than 2 claims. Notably, 
institutions located in just five of China’s 31 provinces (Sichuan, Jilin, Liaoning, 
Shandong, and Henan) accounted for nearly half of the total number of applications. 
[Table 4: PVP applications by applicant and type of crop] 
While there is a reasonably close correspondence between the patterns of overall 
R&D spending and PVP applications, the links between research and the intellectual 
property sought by an individual research institute is less clear-cut. The Jilin AAS is a 
relatively large provincial research institute with a total of 1,055 staff in 2000 (including 
404 scientific researchers) focusing on maize and soybean research. Sichuan AAS and 
Jiangsu AAS are also large institutes, comparable to Jilin AAS, with 1,530 and 1,200 
staff respectively, and an emphasis on rice, cotton, and wheat research. Not surprisingly, 
these three institutes sought significant numbers of PVP certificates and the crop 
orientation of their PVP applications aligns with their respective research emphases.   20 
What is surprising is that some smaller research institutes like Laizhou AAS (a 
prefectural institute in Shandong province with 380 staff engaged heavily in maize 
breeding) and Dandong AAS (a similarly sized prefectural institute in Liaoning province) 
also sought varietal rights comparable in number to the larger institutes mentioned above. 
At the other extreme is the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Science (CAAS), a national 
institute with a large staff (about 9,000, split evenly between scientists and support staff) 
and a research budget of about $35 million in 2001, which sought only 17 PVP 
certificates through to July 2003.
30 
Financial factors seem relevant regarding the decision to apply for PVP 
protection. The comparatively large number of PVP applications from financially 
strapped agencies such as Heilongjiang AAS, Dandong AAS, and Laizhou AAS are 
indicative of their interest in reaping the potential rewards from commercializing their 
technologies. Other institutes with comparatively abundant resources, like CAAS, have 
made less effort to protect varieties for revenue raising purposes. Moreover, commercial 
successes prior to the passage of the PVP Law in 1999 may account for the application 
behavior of some institutes. For example, the commercial success of the “Yedan” series 
of hybrid maize seeds developed by Li Denghai, now president of Laizhou AAS, might 
have stimulated subsequent PVP application by the institute. Personal traits can also be 
important in understanding the pattern of applications: the presidents of Jilin AAS and 
                                                 
30 In late 2002 CAAS began implementing a radical restructuring program that will take several years to 
complete. The intent is to reduce staff on core government support to 2,800 (down from the current 9,000) 
without a commensurate reduction in funding so that salaries can rise sufficiently to retain and recruit 
good scientists, and to remove excess support personnel and less productive scientific staff. Those staff 
not supported by government, are to be paid from revenue earning operations run by CAAS or retired, 
although in the later case the lack of a national social security program means that CAAS is saddled with 
paying all retirement costs.   21 
Laizhou AAS are known to be well versed in intellectual property matters and attuned to 
the commercialization prospects of new technologies. However, the most important 
factor may be the overly optimistic expectation of breeders or research administrators 
about the appropriable size of the Chinese seed market, as analyzed below. 
Economic Evaluation of China’s PVP Applications 
The current and expected size of commercial seed markets in China is both affected by 
and provides incentives for generating, acquiring, and maintaining intellectual property 
rights over seeds. Decisions to establish and protect intellectual property involve 
economic choices about the costs and benefits of doing so. As described above, PVPs in 
China involve especially onerous administrative costs, even by developed-country 
standards. Expectations about the future size of commercial seed markets in China and 
the appropriability of rents in relation to those future markets circumscribe the PVP costs 
that rights holders are willing to incur. Crops for which the propensity to use saved or 
informally (often farmer to farmer) exchanged seed is high and likely to persist provide 
few opportunities to recoup the cost of developing and protecting property rights to new 
seed varieties. Ceteris paribus, higher valued crops and those with significant market 
transactions give a greater incentive to acquire and maintain the rights to new varieties.  
According to ISF (2002), worldwide seed sales are US$30 billion, of which 
China’s domestic market accounts for about 10 percent. The basis for these figures is not 
revealed, nor are crop specific values reported. Thus, combining data obtained from 
publicly available databases with additional information gained from numerous 
interviews of those engaged in or familiar with Chinese seed markets, we estimated the 
current size of the commercial seed market for 14 principal crops (and additionally   22 
hybrid and non-hybrid varieties for four of those crops) (Table 5). Present values of the 
future sale of seed are then used to investigate the incentives to develop and protect new 
seeds in commercially important segments of the Chinese market. 
[Table 5: Size of domestic seed markets for commercially important crops in China, 
2000] 
 
Total seed consumption by farmers for important crops and vegetables is reported 
in column 3, obtained by multiplying the area sown for each crop (column 2) by its 
average sowing rate (column 1). This represents the total seed planted, irrespective of its 
source. For many non-hybrid crops farmers save seeds for use in subsequent plantings so 
only a fraction of the seed consumed is traded in commercial markets.
31 Column 4 gives 
the consensus estimates we obtained of the rate of seed replacement, defined here as the 
proportion of sown seed purchased through commercial markets.
32 Seed replacement 
rates, seed consumption and average prices were then used to estimate the value of 
China’s commercial seed market for selective crops in local (column 6) and U.S. dollar 
(column 7) units. 
The total value of commercial seed sales in 2000 for the 14 crops in table 5 is 
about US$2.3 billion, including $1.5 billion for the 7 major food crops we valued, $0.6 
billion for vegetable and fruit crops, and $0.2 billion for oil and other crops. In 2000, the 
area cropped for agriculture totaled 156.3 million hectares, of which 108.4 million 
hectares were for food crops, 15.2 million for vegetables and fruits, and the rest for 
                                                 
31 For our baseline estimates in table 5 we took the extent of informal seed exchange among farmers to be 
negligible, thus these estimates represent an upper-bound indication of the current value of the 
commercial seed market in China. 
32 Hybrid varieties of corn, rice, and vegetables have comparatively high seed replacement rates (almost 
100 percent), whereas self-pollinated crops such as wheat and millet have lower replacement rates, 
deemed to be in the 20 to 30 percent range in 2000.   23 
rapeseed and other oil crops, cotton, tea, and so on (China National Bureau of Statistics 
2001). The crops included in table 5 accounts for about 90 percent of the total area sown 
to food crops, 50 percent of the area in vegetables and fruits, and 35 percent of the area in 
other crops. Using the respective area shares to recalibrate the crop seed values directly 
estimated in table 5, we figure the value of the Chinese seed market for all agricultural 
crops in 2000 was about US$3.4 billion (or 28.7 billion yuan). 
Plant breeders base their decisions on whether to develop and protect new 
varieties on the present and expected future size of the appropriable commercial seed 
market. If the present value of the expected return from the variety exceeds the present 
value of the cost of R&D and IP protection, then breeders will invest in varietal 
development.
33 Expanding on the reduced form of the decision problem described by 
equation (1), the present value of benefits from developing and protecting a 
representative crop variety can be expressed as 
  () ( , ,,) d PV f Q P Π= ∆ ρ β. (2) 
The quantity of seed demanded, Qd, is itself a function of the average share of 
sown area for each variety, the seed sowing rate per hectare, and the rate of seed 
replacement per season per crop. The seed price premium, ∆P (i.e., the price paid for 
improved seed relative to the price of extant varieties) depends both on the quality of the 
seed, which affects the potential size of the price premium, and the strength of 
intellectual property rights, which affects the share of the potential premium appropriable 
by the breeder. Well-enforced property rights limit the scope of illegal reproduction and 
                                                 
33 Typically, the R&D decision entails investing in a varietal development program that generates a stream 
of new varieties, but this will not materially alter the IP decisions that are the focus of our attention.    24 
sale of protected seed so that a larger share of the potential price premium accrues to 
breeders. The probability of commercial success of the variety, ρ, depends both on the 
productive quality of the seed as well as market structure aspects that effect the intensity 
of competition in a given locale for a given crop. The effective commercial life of the 
variety is affected by the rate of release of competing varieties and the rate of biological 
obsolescence, while the discount factor β affects the size of the present value of the 
benefit stream. 
The inherent uncertainty of estimating future benefit streams compounded by the 
lack of relevant data makes estimating the present value of the expected return 
problematic. Nonetheless, we compiled sufficient information to develop order-of-
magnitude estimates of these present values for representative varieties of maize, rice, 
wheat, soybean, and potato for China (Table 6). The intent here is to demonstrate how 
variations in the strength of property protection–i.e., the degree of appropriability of the 
price premium and the effective life of the varietal rights–affect the incentive to develop 
and protect improved varieties, and to compare the economically rational number of 
PVPs with the actual number of PVPs sought over a recent 13 month period.
34  
[Table 6: Indications of the Extent of Varietal Protection under Different IP Regimes] 
Table 6 gives an indication of the likely present values of the returns accruing to 
Chinese breeders of a representative maize, rice, wheat, soybean, and potato variety 
                                                 
34 Building on the estimates provided in table 5, the results in table 6 assume that the representative variety 
for each crop included occupies 1 percent of the total sown area for each crop; there is a 2 percent 
reduction per year in this seeding rate due to improvements in seed quality over time; the probability of 
research success is one percent; the present value of research costs for each variety is 10,000 yuan; the 
effective life of a variety is 7 years; and discount rate is 6 percent (i.e., β = 0.95). In addition, we assumed 
that farmers’ rate of seed replacement and the area sown to each crop are constant over time. Costs 
include only the government charges and exclude the private costs of preparing PVP submission and 
exercising exclusionary rights.   25 
based on our best estimates of the future value of the respective seed markets in China 
(from table 5) and the institutional and IP realities facing crop breeders (see footnote 34 
for details). Here we analyze the effects of different intellectual property regimes by 
simulating a range of returns to breeders based on variations in varietal protection. The 
upper panel involves a set of simulations in which returns are appropriated for only 7 
years or the legal limit of the right (15 years), while the appropriable price premium 
varies from 100 percent of the average price in table 5 for “strong” rights to 10 percent 
for “weak” rights (plus an intermediate case when the premium equals 50 percent of the 
average price). The central panel gives an indication of the present value of the cost of 
developing and protecting a new variety under different IP regimes and under the U.S. 
cost structure with no annual maintenance fee. For each of these IP and cost regimes, the 
bottom panel of table 6 provides an estimate of the number of varieties for which IP 
protection makes economic sense.  
Comparing among crops, it is clear that market size is an important determinate of 
the economically rational extent of intellectual property protection. Given the costs of 
varietal development and protection, the comparatively small size of the Chinese market 
for potato seed provides little incentive to protect new potato varieties presuming the 
current low rate of commercial seed replacement persists. Conversely, with plausible 
assumptions regarding the effective life of a varietal right (see lower panel of table 6), it 
makes economic sense to protect upwards of 124 new varieties of hybrid corn each year. 
The economic extent of protection is also sensitive to the price premium appropriated by 
breeders; a tenfold increase in the premium (comparing weak versus strong rights) results 
in a proportionate increase in the number of varietal rights.    26 
Because the costs of maintaining varietal rights in China increases along with the 
benefits as the varietal life lengthens, the economic extent of protection is less sensitive 
to variations in the life of the right than changes in the price premium appropriated by 
breeders. In fact, lengthening the effective life of varietal rights in China (comparing the 
results of 7- versus 15-year lives) marginally increases the number of varieties for which 
protection is economically justified. Indeed if China were to adopt a U.S. style cost 
profile by eliminating its annual maintenance fee, the present value of IP costs are 
diminished relative to the costs of research such that the economic number of protected 
varieties increases substantially. In table 6, for example, the number of hybrid maize 
varieties for which protection is rationally sought increases from 124 to 206 varieties per 
year under a strong IP regime if a U.S. cost structure were adopted. Clearly this result is 
especially sensitive to assumptions about the costs of research. Finally, a comparison of 
our simulation results with the actual extent of protection are consistent with breeders 
perceiving that China’s IP regimes give more protection (or are likely to do so in the 
future) than the institutional evidence suggests is currently the case.
35  
5.  Conclusion 
Keeping with the general structure of research in China, public agencies account for the 
majority of total PVP applications (more than 80 percent), in contrast to the situation in 
the United States where more than 85 percent of the applicants are private firms. Given 
its longer history, the institutional interest in PVP protection is naturally much greater in 
the United States (with more than 600 entities applying for protection since 1971) than 
                                                 
35 Alternatively it could be that crop breeders in China expect the overall value of domestic seed markets to 
grow substantially larger than we predicted when forming these estimates.   27 
China (with about 200 entities seeking protection), although the pattern of institutional 
protection is similar. In both countries, the top 5 applicants account for about a quarter of 
the total number of applications, with the remaining applications being lodged by a large 
number of other entities. 
In line with the general patent literature (as surveyed by Jaffe 2000 and Gallini 
2002), we find that the economically rational extent of PVP protection in China is more 
sensitive to appropriability conditions in a given year (analogous to the “scope” of 
protection) than the extent of appropriability over time (i.e., the length of protection). In 
part, this stems from the structure of PVP protection in China that requires the payment 
of annual fees that increase with time to maintain options over varietal rights, in an 
analogous way to the structure of patent costs generally. In contrast, the structure of PVP 
costs in the United States requires an up-front payment with no recurring maintenance 
fees. We demonstrate that if China adopted the U.S. pattern of PVP costs, the economic 
extent of protection would expand considerably. However, this result is sensitive to a 
number of assumptions, not least those regarding the present value of the costs to develop 
new varieties versus the costs of protecting the intellectual property embodied in them.   28 
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Fees Chinese  yuan         Official market 
       exchange rate
a 
   Purchasing power 
   parity rate
b 
Establishing Rights       
 Application  fee  1,800  217  994 
 Examination  fee  4,600  556  2,541 
        
Maintaining Rights       
     ( cost per year) 
   Years  1-3  1,500  181  829 
   Years  4-6  1,950  236  1,077 
   Years  7-9  2,535  306  1,401 
   Years  10-12  3,295  398  1,820 
   Years  13-15  4,283  517  2,366 
    Years 16-18  5,567  672   3,076 
   Years  19-20  7,237  874  3,998 
  Total maintenance fee (15 years)   40,689  4,914  22,480 
  Total maintenance fee (20 years)   71,864  8,679  39,704 
      
Total cost       
 Agricultural  plants 
(15 years of protection)  
47,089 5,687  26,016 
 Forestry 
(20 years of protection)  
78,264 9,452  43,240 
 
Source: China Ministry of Agriculture (1999) 
 
a. The 1999 exchange rate used here was US$1 = 8.28 yuan. 
b. The 1999 purchasing power parity rate is US$1 = 1.81 yuan World Bank (2001). 
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Table 2: PVP applications by crop 
 
Crop     Number of applications      
        
First 13 mo. 
of sample
a 
Second 13 mo. 
of sample
a 
Third 13 mo. 
of sample
a 
Last 13 mo. 
of sample
a  Total   
Share of total 
 
     (count)    (percent) 
Food  crops  135 172 183 319 809    88 
  M a i z e            
  Hybrid  77  71  78  113  339    37 
  Non-hybrid  39  35  24  21  119    13 
  R i c e            
  Hybrid  13  26  46  130  215    23 
  Non-hybrid  5  17  13  22  57    6 
  Wheat  0  5  21 23 49    5 
  Soybean  0 16 1  7 24    3 
  Potato  1 2 0 2 5    1 
  Sweet  potato  0 0 0 1 1    0 
               
Vegetable  crops  4  2  12 16 34    4 
  Chinese  cabbage  4 1 5 4  14    2 
  Water  melon  0 0 4 5 9    1 
  Tomato  0 1 2 3 6    1 
 Other  vegetables
b  0 0 1 4 5    1 
               
Fruit  crops  0  2 10 7 19    2 
  Pear  0 2 9 2  13    1 
  Peach  0 0 0 5 5    1 
 Other  fruit
c  0 0 1 0 1    0 
               
Ornamental crops
d  1 1 4 6  12    1 
               
Other  crops  0  13 17 19 49    5 
  Rapeseed  0  3  11 17 31    3 
  Pepper  0 7 2 1  10    1 
  Peanut  0 3 4 1 8    1 
               
Total      140 190 226 367 923    100 
 
Source: Compiled by authors from China Ministry of Agriculture (various issues) 
 
a. The first thirteen months of the sample includes April 1999 – April 2000; the second 13 months, 
May 2000 – May 2001; the third 13 months, June 2001 – June 2002; the last 13 months, July 
2002 – July 2003. 
b. Other vegetables include cucumber and wild cabbage. 
c. Other fruit includes leech. 
d. Ornamental crops include chrysanthemum, lily and tulip.   33 







b  Share of total 
   (count) (percent) 
Public research institution     
 National  19  2 
 Provincial  318  34 
 Prefectural  224  24 
 University  82  9 
Seed development firm (by research institute)  54  6 
State-owned seed company (agribusiness firm)  43  5 
Shareholding company  149  16 
Multinational 5  1 
Individual 23  2 
Others (foreigners)  6  1 
Total 923  100 
 
Source: Compiled by authors from China Ministry of Agriculture (various issues) 
 
a. This classification structure is taken from Fan et at. (2003). 
b. Joint applications (a total of 100) are assigned according to the name of the first applicant. 
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Table 4: PVP applications by applicant and type of crop 
 
   Applications     Crop 
Applicant  Share Number   Maize  Rice  Wheat  Rapeseed  Soybean  Cabbage Others 
  (percent)  (count)               
Jilin AAS
a  7 67    50 6      11     
Jiangsu AAS  4  34    5  17  5  1      6 
Heilongjiang AAS  3  29    21  3      3    2 
Laizhou  AAS  3  28    21  0      6  1 
Dandong AAS  3  25    22  2      1     
Hunan  AAS  3 24     20         4 
Sichuan  AAS  3  24    4  18  2      
Yibin ASRI
b  3 24     24          
Henan AAS  2  20    11    3  1    4  1 
Jilin Jinong Hi-tech Development Co.  2  19    19             
Sichuan Agricultural University  2  18    6  7  5         
CAAS 2  17    2  4    3    1  7 
Anhui  AAS  2 16    1 9 1  2  3     
Other applicants  62  578    296  162  33  24  6  3  54 
Total  100  923    458  272  49 31 24  14  75 
 
Source: Compiled by authors from China Ministry of Agriculture (various issues) 
 
Note: Includes data on the total number of applications lodged from April 1999 to July 2003. 
 
a. AAS denotes Academy of Agricultural Science.  
b. ASRI denotes Agricultural Science Research Institute.  
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Table 5: Size of domestic seed markets for commercially important crops in China, 2000 








replacement rate  Commercial seed sales 
         (1000 ha)  (kg/ha)  (1000 kg)  (Yuan/kg)  (percent)    (1,000 yuan)  (1,000 US dollar) 
     (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)    (6) (7) 
Food crop               
 Maize                
   Hybrid  21,903  45  985,644  6  100    5,913,864 714,235 
   Non-hybrid  1,153  80  92,224  2  15    27,667 3,341 
 Rice                
   Hybrid  14,981  15  224,715  8  90    1,617,948 195,404 
   Non-hybrid  14,981  45  674,145  2.5  30    505,609 61,064 
 Wheat  26,653  170  4,531,010 2  30    2,718,606  328,334 
 Soybean  9,307  90  837,630  3 50    1,256,445  151,745 
 Potato  4,723  9  42,507  1  20    8,501  1,027 
 Millet  1,250  15  18,750  1  20    3,750  453 
 Sorghum  889  15  13,335  5  90    60,008  7,247 
Total       7,419,960       12,112,398  1,462,850 
Vegetable/fruit                
 Chinese  cabbage  2,023  3.5 7,081  120  100    849,660 102,616 
 Pepper  1,309  2  2,618  100 95    248,710  30,037 
 Cucumber  1,168  2  2,336 200  100   467,200  56,425 
 Tomato  1,032  0.5  516  800  90    371,520  44,870 
 Watermelon  1,617  2  3,234  1000 100    3,234,000  390,580 
Total       15,785       5,171,090  624,528 
Oil and other crop               
 Rapeseed                
   Hybrid  2,998  3  8,993  35  100    314,748 38,013 
   Non-hybrid  4,496  3  13,489  7  50    47,212 5,702 
 Cotton                
   Hybrid  404  20  8,082  60  100    484,920 58,565 
   Non-hybrid  2,829  60  169,722  5  30    254,583 30,747 
   GM  808  20  16,164  40  50    323,280 39,043 
Total         216,450       1,424,743  172,070 
                  
Total (15 crops)            18,708,231  2,259,448 
 
Source: Data for the area sown are from China National Bureau of Statistics (2001). Estimates of the sowing rate, seed price, and seed 
replacement rate are national averages obtained from consulting knowledgeable Chinese. Pray et al. (1998) also includes information that was 
useful in calibrating these simulations. 
 
Note: The ratio of hybrid to non-hybrid seed is 9.5:0.5 for corn, 5:5 for rice, 4:6 for rapeseed, and 1:7:2(GM) for cotton. Commercial seed market in 
US dollar was calculated using an exchange rate of US$1 = 8.28 yuan.   36 
Table 6: Indications of the extent of varietal protection under different IP regimes 
Category     Hybrid maize  Hybrid rice  N-hybrid rice  Wheat  Soybean  Potato 
Present value of revenue  (yuan per variety) 
  Effective  length  of  protection  (7  years)        
      Weak IPR          337,848             92,430             28,884           155,309             71,778                 486  
      Intermediate IPR       1,689,238           462,151           144,422           776,544           358,891               2,428  
      Strong IPR       3,378,476           924,302           288,845        1,553,087           717,783               4,857  
  Statutory length of protection  (15  years)        
      Weak IPR          565,098           154,603            48,313          259,776           120,059                 812  
      Intermediate IPR       2,825,489           773,013           241,567        1,298,878           600,296               4,026 
      Strong IPR       5,650,977        1,546,026           483,133        2,597,757        1,200,593               8,123  
              
Present  value  of  cost(a)        
  Effective length of protection (7 years)            27,311             27,311             27,311             27,311             27,311             27,311  
  Statutory length of protection (15 years)            43,289             43,289            43,289            43,289            43,289            43,289  
  US cost structure (no maintenance fee)            16,400             16,400             16,400             16,400             16,400             16,400  
              
Number of annual PVP applications  (PVP count per year) 
  Chinese cost structure           
    Effective length of protection (7 years)             
      Weak  IPR  12 3 1 6 3  0.0 
      Intermediate  IPR  62 17  5 28 13  0.1 
      Strong  IPR  124 34 11 57 26  0.2 
    Statutory length of protection  (15  years)        
      Weak  IPR  13 4 1 6 3  0.0 
      Intermediate  IPR  65 18  6 30 14  0.1 
      Strong  IPR  131 36 11 60 28  0.2 
  US cost structure (no maintenance fee)        
    Effective length of protection (7 years)             
      Weak  IPR  21 6 2 9 4  0.0 
      Intermediate  IPR  103 28  9 47 22  0.1 
      Strong  IPR  206 56 18 95 44  0.3 
    Statutory length of protection  (15  years)        
   Weak  IPR  34    9  3  16  7  0.0 
      Intermediate  IPR  172 47 15 79 37  0.2 
   Strong  IPR  345    94  29  158  73  0.5 
              
Actual annual number of PVP application  113  130  22  23  7  2 
 
Source: Calculated by authors. 
 
a. Include the costs of developing the variety and the administrative costs of seeking and maintaining varietal protection.   37 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Compiled by authors from China Ministry of Agriculture (various issues) 